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In its primitive form, there is a relation between each term in the language and a piece of THE WORLD (or a kind of piece, if the term is a general term).
This relation --the relation of reference --is given by the truth --conditional semantics for the language, in the canonical versions of the theory --i.e., understanding a term, say, T1, consists in knowing what piece of THE WORLD it refers to (or in knowing a necessary and sufficient condition for it to refer to a piece of THE WORLD, in some versions). I shall not assume this account of understanding to be part of the picture in what follows, although it certainly was assumed by metaphysical realists in the past.
Minimally, however, there has to be a determinate relation of reference between terms in L and pieces (or sets of pieces) of THE WORLD, on the metaphysical realist model, whether understanding L is taken to consist in "knowing" that relation or not. What makes this picture different from internal realism (which employs a similar picture within a theory) is that (1) the picture is supposed to apply to all correct theories at once (so that it can only be stated with "Typical Ambiguity" --i.e., it transcends complete formalization in any one theory); and (2) THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representation we have of it -indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent THE WORLD correctly at all (e.g., we might all be "brains in a vat", the metaphysical realist tells us).
The most important consequence of metaphysical realism is that truth is supposed to be radically non-epistemic -we might be "brains in a vat" and so th6 theory that is "ideal" from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty and elegance, "plausibility", simplicity, "conservatism", etc., might be false. "Verified" (in any operational sense) does not imply "true", on the metaphysical realist picture, even in the ideal limit.
It is this feature that distinguishes metaphysical realism, as I am using the term, from the mere belief that there is an ideal theory (Peircean realism), or, more weakly, that an ideal theory is a regulative ideal presupposed by the notions "true" and "objective" as they have classically been understood. And it is this feature that I shall attack! So let T1 be an ideal theory, by our lights. Lifting restrictions on our actual all-too-finite powers, we can imagine T1 to have every property except objective truth -which is left open --that we like. E.g., T1 can be imagined complete, consistent, to predict correctly all observation sentences (as far as we can tell), to meet whatever "operational constraints" there are (if these are "fuzzy", let T1 seem to clearly meet them), to be "beautiful", "simple", "plausible", etc. The supposition under consideration is that T1 might be all this and still be (in reality) false.
I assume THE WORLD has (or can be broken into) infinitely many pieces. I also assume T1 says there are infinitely many things (so in this respect T1 is "objectively right" about THE WORLD). Now T1 is consistent (by hypothesis) and has (only) infinite models. So by the completeness theorem (in its model theoretic form), T1 has a model of every infinite cardinality. Pick a model M of the same cardinality as THE WORLD.3 Map the individuals of M one-to-one into the pieces of THE WORLD, and use the mapping to define the relations of M directly in THE WORLD. The result is a satisfaction relation SAT -a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of pieces of THE WORLD -such that the theory T1 comes out true -true of THE WORLD --provided we just interpret 'true' as TRUE(SAT)4. So what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory T1 might really be false?
Well, it might be claimed that SAT is not the intended correspondence between L and THE WORLD. What does 'intended' come to here? T1 has the property of meeting all operational constraints. So, if "there is a cow in front of me at such-and-such a time" belongs to T1 then, "there is a cow in front of me at such-and-such a time" will certainly seem to be trueit will be "exactly as if' there were a cow in front of me at that time. But SAT is a true interpretation of T1. T1 is TRUE(SAT). So "there is a cow in front of me at such-and-such a time" is "True" in this sense --TRUE (SAT).
On the other hand, if "there is a cow in front of me at such-and-such a time" is operationally "false" (falsified) then "there is a cow in front of me at such-and-such a time" is FALSE(SAT). So, the interpretation of "reference" in L as SAT certainly meets all operational constraints on reference. But the interpretation of "reference" as SAT certainly meets all theoretical constraints on reference--it makes the ideal theory, T1, come out true.
So what further constraints on reference are there that could single out some other interpretation as (uniquely) "intended", and SAT as an "unintended" interpretation (in the model-theoretic sense of "interpretation")? The supposition that even an "ideal" theory (from a pragmatic point of view) might really be false appears to collapse into unintelligiblity.
Notice that a "causal" theory of reference is not (would not be) of any help here: for how 'causes' can uniquely refer in as much of a puzzle as how 'cat' can, on the metaphysical realist picture. Now the puzzle about what singles out one correspondence as the relation of reference does not arise. The notion of "reference" is not used in the semantics. We can introduce "refers" into the language a la Tarski, but then (1) "Cow" refers to cows, will simply be a tautology -and the understanding of (1) makes no reference to the metaphysical realist picture at all.
One important point. It is not good to do the non-realist semantics (I would rather call it verificationist semantics -because it is not incompatible with internal realism), --in terms of any level of "hard facts", even sense data. For if sense data are treated as "hard data" --if the verificationist semantics is given in a meta-language for which itself we give the truth-conditional account of understanding -then we can repeat the whole argument against the intelligibility of metaphysical realism (as an argument against the intelligibility of the meta-language) --just think of the past sense-data (or the future ones) as the "external" part of THE WORLD. (This is a reconstruction of one aspect of Wittgenstein's private language argument.) This is why Dummett's move depends upon using the verificationist semantics all the way up (or down) --in the meta-language, the meta-meta-language, etc.
The reason I got involved in this problem is this: in "Reference and Understanding" I argued that one could give a model of a speaker of the language in terms of the notion of "degree of confirmation" (which might better be called "degree of verification" when it has this understanding-theoretic role). And I contended that the realist notions of truth and reference come in not in explaining what goes on "in the heads" of speakers, but in explaining the success of language-using. Thus I urged that we accept a species of "verificationist" semantics. Indeed, I believe that this is true. But it isn't all the moral. Metaphysical realism collapsed at a particular point. (I am going to argue that it also collapses at other points.) And the point at which it collapsed tells us something. Metaphysical realism collapses just at the point at which it claims to be distinguishable from Peircean realism --i.e., from the claim that there is an ideal theory (I don't mean that even that claim isn't problematical, but it is problematical in a different way). Since Peirce himself (and the verificationists) always said metaphysical realism collapses into incoherence at just that point, and realists like myself thought they were wrong, there is no avoiding the unpleasant admission that "they were right and we were wrong" on at least one substantive issue.
I now want to talk about other points at which the metaphysical realist picture is incoherent. Consider the following simple universe: let THE WORLD be a straight line, thus In particular, I believed, it can happen that what we picture as "incompatible" terms can be mapped onto the same Real Object --though not, of course, within the same theory. Thus the Real Object that is labeled "point" in one theory might be labeled "set of convergent line segments" in another theory. And the same term might be mapped onto one Real Object in one theory and onto a different Real Object in another theory. It is a property of the world itself, I claimed -i.e., a property of THE WORLD itself --that it "admits of these different mappings".
The problem -as Nelson Goodman has been emphasizing for many, many years --is that this story may retain THE WORLD but at the price of giving up any intelligible notion of how THE WORLD is. Any sentence that changes truth-value upon passing from one correct theory to another correct theory --e.g., an Equivalent Description --will express only a theory-relative property of THE WORLD. And the more such sentences there are, the more properties of THE WORLD will turn out to be theory-relative.
For example, if we concede that Story 1 and Story 2 are Equivalent Descriptions, then the property being an object (as opposed to a class or set of things) will be theory relative. Consider now a third story, Story 3: There are only line segments with rational end points (i.e., since there aren't "points", in this story, except as logical constructions, (1) every line segment has rational length; (2) the piece of the line7 between any two line segments is a line segment, and so has rational length; (3) every line segment is divisible into n equal pieces, for every integer n; (4) there is at least one line segment; and (5) the union of two line segments is a line segment.) Irrational line segments are treated as logical constructions -sets of "points" are themselves Cauchy convergent sets of rational line segments.
A "hard core" realist might again object, this time because this story makes an irrational line segment of a different logical type than a rational line segment. But the defender of this story can reply: "Isn't it common in mathematics that objects are identified with sets of other objects which are pre-analytically of the same logical type? Thus, negative integers and positive integers whole numbers and rationals, rationals and reals, reals and imaginaries are preanalytically all 'numbers', but in formalizing mathematics we are used to treating negative numbers (or more generally, 'signed numbers') as ordered pairs of 'natural numbers', rational numbers as ordered pairs of 'signed numbers', irrationals as sets of rationals, etc. So what is wrong with treating irrational line segments as sets of sets of rational line segments? After all, the rational line segments are a basis for the topology; if you know what is going on in every rational line segment, you have a complete description of all events, etc." If we accept Story 3 as yet another Equivalent Description of THE WORLD, however, then even the cardinality of the world becomes theory relative! For there are only denumerably many objects in Story 3, and nondenumerably many in Stories 1 and 2! (We might try to avoid this by treating sets as "objects", too --but, as I've shown elsewhere, "set" talk can be translated away into possibility talk.) All this isn't an artifact of my simple example: actual physical theory is rife with similar examples. One can construe space-time points as objects, for example, or as properties. One can construe fields as objects, or do everything with particles acting at a distance (using retarded potentials). The fact is, so many properties of THE WORLD --starting with just the categorical ones, such as cardinality, particulars or universals, etc. --turn out to be "theory relative" that THE WORLD ends up as a Kantian "noumenal" world, a mere "thing in itself', If one cannot say how THE WORLD is theory-independently, then talk of all these theories as descriptions of THE WORLD is empty.
Another point at which the metaphysical realist picture runs into trouble. This has to do with what Quine calls "ontological relativity". Suppose we confine attention, for the moment, to complete theories. If T is a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation on its terms --provable coextensiveness --with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes, then in no model of the theory do they refer to the same referent, whereas if they belong to the same equivalence class, then they have the same referent in every model of the theory. So, for our purposes, we may count terms as the same if they lie in the same equivalence class -i.e., if they are "coextensive taking the theory at face value". With this preliminary identification made, we notice that if our picture is correct --I repeat the picture But it is notorious that there are often inequivalent relative interpretations of one theory in another. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2 (in the case of our example) in many different ways. "Points" can be sets of line segments whose lengths are negative powers of 2, for example, or sets of line segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3.
If the picture as I drew it were correct, there would have to be a "fact of the matter" as to which translation really preserves reference in every such case! Just as we complicated the picture by allowing the same term to be mapped onto different Real Objects when it occurs in different theories to meet the previous objection, so we could complicate the picture again to meet the second objection: we could say that the language has more than one correct way of being mapped onto THE WORLD (it must, since it has more than one way of being correctly mapped onto a language which is itself correctly mapped onto the world). But now all grasp of the picture seems to vanish: if what is a unique set of things within a correct theory may not be a unique set of things "in reality", then the very heart of the picture is torn out.
Why all this doesn't refute internal realism.
Suppose we try to stump the internal realist with the question, "How do you know that 'cow' refers to cows?" "After all", we point out, "there are other interpretations of your whole language --non-denumerably many interpretations (in the sense of satisfaction-relations), which would render true an ideal theory (in your language). Indeed, suppose God gave us the set of all true sentences in your language (pretend we have infinite memories, for this purpose). Call this set the perfect theory. Then there would still be infinitely many admissable interpretations of the perfect theory --interpretations which, as we saw, satisfied all the operational and theoretical constraints. Even the sentence "'Cow' refers to cows" is true in all of these interpretations. So how do you know that it is true in the sense of being true in a unique "intended" interpretation? How do you know that 'cow' refers to cows in the sense of referring to one determinate set of things, as opposed to referring to a determinate set of things in each admissible interpretation?" (This is, of course, just arguing against the internal realist exactly as we argued against the metaphysical realist.)
The internal realist should reply that "'Cow' refers to cows" follows immediately from the definition of 'refers'. In fact, "'cow' refers to cows" would be true even if internal realism were false: although we can revise "'Cow' refers to cows" by scrapping the theory itself (or at least scrapping or challenging the notion of a cow) --and this is how the fact that "'Cow' refers to cows" is not absolutely unrevisable manifests itself --relative to the theory, "'Cow' refers to cows" is a logical truth.
The critic will now reply that his question hasn't been answered. "'Cow' refers to cows" is indeed analytic relative to the theory --but his question challenged the way the theory is understood. "'Cow' refers to cows" is true in all admissible interpretations of the theory --but that isn't at issue.
The internal realist should now reply that (1) "the way the theory is understood" can't be discussed within the theory; and (2) the questioa whether the theory has a unique intended interpretation has no absolute sense. Viewed from within Story 1 (or a meta-language which contains the objct language of Story 1), "point" has a "unique intended interpretation". Viewed from within Story 2 (or a meta-language which contains the object language of Story 2), the term "point" as used in Story 1 has a plurality of admissible interpretations. The critic's "how do you know?" question assumes a theoryindependent fact of the matter as to what a term in a given theory corresponds to --i.e., assumes the picture of metaphysical realism; and this is a picture the internal realist need not (and better not) accept.
The critic now replies as follows: "reference" (strictly speaking, 'satisfies') is defined so that ( What I am saying is that, in a certain "contextual" sense, it is an a priori truth that 'cow' refers to a determinate class of things (or a more-or-less determinate class of things --I neglect ordinary vagueness). Adopting "cow talk" is adopting a "version", in Nelson Goodman's phrase, from within which it is a priori that the word 'cow' refers (and, indeed, that it refers to cows).
One of the puzzling things about the metaphysical realist picture is that it makes it unintelligible how there can be a priori truths, even contextual ones, even as a (possibly unreachable) limit. An a priori truth would have to be the product of a kind of direct "intuition" of the things themselves. Even verbal truth is hard to understand. Consider "all bachelors are unmarried". It can be "verbal" that this is in some sense "short for" "all unmarried men are unmarried". And this, in turn, is an instance of "All AB are A". But why is this true?
Suppose there were unrevisability --absolute unrevisability. And suppose we held "All AB are A" (and even "All unmarried men are unmarried") absolutely immune from revision. Why would this make it true? Suppose, unimaginably, there are some AB that are not A. (After all, there are lots of things in modem science we can't imagine) Then, on the metaphysical realist picture, our refusal to give up assenting to "All AB are A" doesn't make it true --it just makes us stubbom.9
Once we abandon the metaphysical realist picture, the situation becomes quite different. Suppose we include a sentence S in the ideal theory T1 just because it is a feature we want the ideal theory to have that it contain S. (Suppose we even hold S "immune" from revision, as a behavioristic fact about us.) Assuming S doesn't make T1 inconsistent, T1 still has a model. And since the
